Abstract. We consider stability theory for Polish spaces and more generally for definable structures. We succeed to prove existence of indiscernibles under reasonable conditions; this gives strong evidence that such a theory exists.
Introduction
Question 0.1. Is there a stability theory/classification theory of Polish spaces/algebras (more generally definable structures say on the continuum)?
Naturally we would like to develop a parallel to classification theory (see [Sh:c] ). A natural test problem is to generalize "Morley theorem = Los conjecture". But we only have one model so does it mean anything?
Well, we may change the universe. If we deal with abelian groups (or any variety) it is probably more natural to ask when is such (definable) algebra free.
Example 0.2. If P is adding (2 ℵ0 ) + -Cohen subsets of ω then (C) V and (C)
V [G] are both algebraically closed fields of characteristic 0 which are not isomorphic (as they have different cardinalities). So we restrict ourselves to forcing P 1 ⋖ P 2 such that
and compare the Polish models in V P1 , V P2 . We may restrict our forcing notions to c.c.c. or whatever.
Example 0.3. Under any such interpretation (a) C = the field of complex numbers is categorical (b) R = the field of the reals is not (by adding 2 ℵ0 many Cohen reals).
(Why? Trivially: P2] is not complete, but there are less trivial reasons).
Conjecture 0.4. We have a dychotomy, i.e. either the model is similar to categorical theories, or there are "many complicated models". So in particular we expect the natural variant of central notions defined below (like categoricity) will be equivalent; in particular we expect that it will be enough to consider the forcing notions of adding Cohen reals. Naturally those questions call for the use of descriptive set theory on the one hand and model theory on the other hand; in particular to using definability in both senses and using L ℵ1,ℵ0 (Q).
Presently, i.e. here there is no serious use of either; the questions are naturally inspired by model theory. It would be natural to consider questions inspired by the investigation of such specific structures; to some extent considering the freeness of a definable Abelian group fall under this.
A priori, trying to connect different direction in mathematics is tempting, but it may well lack non-trivial results. We suggest that the result on the existence of indiscernibility, 3.7, give serious evidence that this is not the case, (but not 1.6, see 1.7(1) because of 3.9.
Let us elaborate suggestion for the definition of "categorical".
Definition 0.5. 1) Let A denote a definition of a τ -structure, τ a countable vocabulary, the set of elements is the reals or a definable set of reals; but we may say "the structure a/model A".
3) We say A is categorical (or categorical 1 , similarly below) when for any forcing notions P ⋖ Q such that "(2
We say A is categorical under ϕ (e.g. ϕ = (2 ℵ0 ≥ ℵ 1 ) means that for any forcing notions P ⋖ Q satisfying P "ϕ", Q "ϕ" and Q "(2
We say A is K-categorical when above P, Q ∈ K (or pairs (P, Q) ∈ K). 5) If λ is a definition of a cardinal then A is categorical in λ, is defined as in (3A) but P "ϕ", Q "ϕ" is replaced by λ[
and this is a non-empty condition; similarly in (3A),(4). 6) Let T be a set of (first order) equation in the countable vocabulary τ . Let A be a Σ 1 1 -model of T . We say A is free 1 for K when for every P ∈ K, A[V P ] is a free algebra. Similarly, parallely to (3A),(4),(5).
3) Similarly for freeness. 4) We may replace Σ 1 1 by "with enough absoluteness".
Thesis 0.7. 1) Classification theory for such models resemble more the case of L ω1,ω than the first order. 2) As there (see [Sh:87a] Theorem 0.8. There is an F σ abelian group (i.e. an F σ -definition, in fact an explicit definition) such that V |= "G is a free abelian group" iff V |= 2 ℵ0 < ℵ 736 .
Comments: In the context of the previous theorem we cannot do better than F σ , but we may hope for some other example which is not a group or categoricity is not because of freeness. The proof gives Conclusion 0.9. For any n < ω for some F σ abelian group, A, A is categorical in ℵ α iff α ≤ n (if cf(α) = ℵ 0 ), then there are no P, Q as in 0.5(5), so categoricity fails by the definition (any n).
A connection with the model theory is that by Hart-Shelah Those questions may cast some light on the thesis that non-first order logics are "more distant" from the "so-called" mainstream mathematics. This work originally was a section in [Sh:771] ; in it we try to look at stability theory in this context, proving the modest (in 3.7):
⊞ for "ℵ 0 -stable Σ 1 1 models" the theorem on the existence of indiscernibles can be generalized.
We may consider another interpretation of "categoricity". Of course, we can use more liberal than L[A 2 , r] or restrict the A ℓ 's further (as in the forcing version).
Definition 0.10. 1) For a definition of a τ -model A (usually with a set of elements a definable set of reals) we say that A is categorical 2 in λ ≤ 2 ℵ0 when : for some real r: for every ,r] are isomorphic (in V). 2) For a class K of forcing notions and cardinal λ we say A is categorical 2 in (λ, K) when for every P ∈ K satisfying P "2 ℵ0 ≥ λ", we have in V P : the structure A is categorical 2 in λ, i.e. in the sense of part (1).
Comparing Definition 0.10(1) with the forcing version we lose when V = L, as it says nothing, we gain as (when 2 ℵ0 > ℵ 1 ) we do not have to go outside the universe. Maybe best is categorical in λ in V P for every c.c.c. forcing notion P making 2 ℵ0 ≥ λ. Note also that it may be advisable in 0.10(1) to restrict ourselves to the case λ is regular as we certainly like to avoid the possibility (2
(see on this and for history in [Sh:g, Ch.VII]).
Of course, any reasonably absolute definition of unstability implies non-categoricity: if we have many types we should have a perfect set of them, hence adding Cohen subsets of ω adds more types realized. If we add η i : i < 2 ℵ0 Cohen reals for every A ⊆ 2 ℵ0 , A V[ηi:i∈A] : A ⊆ 2 ℵ0 are non-isomorphic over the countable set of parameters, if we get 2 2 ℵ 0 non-isomorphic models, we can forget the parameters and retain our "richness in models". The work is to some extent a continuation of 
Generalizing stability in ℵ 0
We may consider the dividing line for abelian groups from [Sh:402] and try to generalize it for any simply defined (e.g. Σ 1 1 or Borel) model. We deal with having two possibilities, in the high, complicated side we get a parallel of non ℵ 0 -stability; in the low side we have a rank. But even for minimal formulas, the example in [Sh:771, §5] shows that we are far from being done, still we may be able to say something on the structure.
We may consider also ranks parallel to the ones for superstable theories. Note that there are two kinds of definability we are considering: the model theoretic one and the set theoretic one.
Context 1.1. 1) If not said otherwise, A will be a structure with countable vocabulary and its set of elements is a set of reals; usually a definition -see 0.5(1). 2) L is a logic. We did not specify the logic; we may assume it is ⊆ L ℵ1,ℵ0 or just L ℵ1,ℵ0 (Q) where Q is the quantifier "there are uncountably many".
in the logic L, and the formula in the vocabulary of A with finitely many free variables, writing ϕ = ϕ(x) means thatx is a finite sequence of variables with no repetitions including the free variables of ϕ.
2) ∆ denotes a set of such formulas andφ denote a pair (ϕ 0 (x), ϕ 1 (x)) of formulas soφ is a ∆-pair if ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 ∈ ∆. 3) We say ϕ (or ∆ orφ) is Σ or understood from the context. 2) If (A, ∆) is a candidate we say A is locally (ℵ 0 , ∆)-stable (or (A, ∆) is ℵ 0 -stable), but we may omit "locally"; when ∆ is a countable set of (A, L )-formulas and for χ large enough and x ∈ H (χ), for every countable N ≺ (H (χ), ∈, < * χ ) to which x belongs andā ∈ m A where m < ω the following weak definability condition on tp ∆ (ā, N ∩ A, A) holds:
3) We say that (A, ∆) is ℵ 0 -unstable (or A is (ℵ 0 , ∆)-unstable, of course, "(ℵ 0 , ∆)-stable" is the negation) iff : there areā η ∈ m A for η ∈ ω 2 and ϕ ν,0 (x,ȳ ν ) ∈ ∆ and ϕ ν,1 (x,ȳ ν ) ∈ ∆ andb ν ∈ ℓg(ȳ) A for ν ∈ ω> 2 such that:
Remark 1.4. There are obvious absoluteness results (forφ ∈ Φ m (A,∆) , (A, ∆) is ℵ 0 -unstable and stable).
Observation 1.5. 1) If ∆ is closed under negation then in Definition 1.3(2) we have
2) In Definition 1.3(2) we can fix x = (A, ∆) and omit < * χ , at the expense of having to use a somewhat larger χ.
Proof. Straight. Claim 1.6. The End-Extention Indiscernibility existence lemma Assume (A, ∆) is an ℵ 0 -stable candidate. 1) In Definition 1.3(2), the demand "N is countable" can be omitted. 2) Assume ∆ is closed under negation and permuting the variables, m < ω,ā α ∈ m A for α < λ and ℵ 0 < λ = cf(λ) and S ⊆ λ is stationary and A ⊆ A has cardinality < λ. Then for some stationary S ′ ⊆ S the sequence ā α : α ∈ S ′ is a ∆-end extension indiscernible sequence over A in A (see Definition 1.8(3),(4),(5) below). 3) Moreover for any pregiven n < ω we can find stationary S ′ ⊆ S such that ā α : α ∈ S ′ is (∆, n)-end extension indiscernible over A in A. 4) We can find a club E of λ and regressive function f n on S ∩ E for n < ω such that:
+ moreover, if n < ω and β, γ < λ then ā α : α ∈ S ∩ E\βandf n (α) = γ is (∆, n)-end extension indiscernible over A ∪ {ā γ : γ < β}.
Remark 1.7. 1) This is a "first round on indiscernibility". But the assumption "∆ is closed under negation" is very strong, as we do not have good non-structure complementary results.
2) The claim and proof are similar to [Sh:c, Ch.III,4.23,pg.120-1], but before proving we define:
Definition 1.8. 1) Let (A, ∆) be a candidate. We say "A has (λ, ∆)-order" when :
A,∆ with ℓg(x) = ℓg(ȳ), linear orders some I ⊆ m( * ) A of cardinality λ, see part (2) for definition.
2) We sayφ(x,ȳ) linear orders I ⊆ A iff for some ā t : t ∈ I we have:
3) For a linear order J (e.g. a set of ordinals), we say ā t : t ∈ J is a ∆-endextension indiscernible (sequence over A) iff for any n < ω and t 0 < J < . . . < J t n−1 < J t n , the sequencesā t0ˆ. . .ā tn−2ˆātn−1 andā t0ˆ. . .ˆā tn−2ˆātn realizes the same ∆-type (over A) in A. 4) We say that ā t : t ∈ J is (∆, n 0 , n 1 )-end-extension indiscernible over A in A when:
(a) J a linear order for some m,ā t ∈ m A, A ⊆ A (b) if r ℓ : ℓ < n 0 , s ℓ : ℓ < n 1 , t ℓ : ℓ < n 1 are < J -increasing sequences, r n0−1 < J s 0 , r n0−1 < J t 0 thenā r0ˆ. . .ˆā rn 0 −1ˆās0ˆ. . .ˆā sn 1 −1 and a r0ˆ. . .ˆā rn 0 −1ˆāt0ˆ. . .ˆā tn 1 −1 realizes the same ∆-type over A in A (c) if J has a last element we allow to decrease n 0 and/or n 1 .
5) If we omit n 0 this means for every n 0 , (so "∆-end extension..." means (∆, 1)-end extension.
Proof. Proof of 1.6 1) Let N * ≺ (H (χ), ∈, < * χ ) be such that A, ∆ ∈ N * . Now for every countable N ≺ N * to which (A, ∆) belongs there is c N ∈ N as mentioned in the definition 1.5(2). Hence by normality of the club filter on [N * ] ℵ0 , the family of countable subsets of N * , for some c * the set N = {N : N ≺ N * is countable and c N = c * } is a stationary subset of [N * ] ℵ0 , so c * can serve for N * . 2) Let N α : α < λ be an increasing continuous sequence of elementary submodels of (H (χ), ∈, < * χ ) to which A belongs, such that N α < λ, N α ∩ λ ∈ λ and α ⊆ N α and ā α : α < λ ∈ N 0 (henceā α ∈ N α+1 ). For each α ∈ S, applying 1.6(1) to N α ,ā α we get c α ∈ N α as in Definition 1.3(2). So for some c * and some stationary subsets of S ′ ⊆ S of λ we have α ∈ S ′ ⇒ c α = c * . Now ∆-end extension indiscernibility follows. 3) We prove this by induction on n:
. .ˆā α ′′ n−1 realizes the same ∆-type over A ∪ {ā γ : γ < β}.
For n = 0 the demand is empty so S ′ = S is as required. For n = 1 apply the proof of part (2). For n + 1 > 1 by the induction hypothesis we can find stationary S 1 ⊆ S as required in ⊠ n λ . For each α < λ we can choose β α,ℓ = β(α, ℓ) for ℓ ≤ n such that α = β α,0 < β α,1 < . . . < β α,n and 0 < ℓ ≤ n ⇒ β α,ℓ ∈ S 1 . Letā * α =ā βα,0ˆ. . .ˆā βα,n soā * α ∈ m(n+1) A and apply the induction hypothesis to m × (n + 1), S 1 , ā * α : α < λ getting a stationary S 2 ⊆ S 1 as required in ⊠ n λ . We claim that S 2 is as required. So assume β ≤ α ′ 0 < . . . < α ′ n < λ and β ≤ α ′′ 0 < . . . < α ′′ n < λ and α ′ ℓ , α ′′ ℓ ∈ S 2 . Now, letting β(α, ℓ) = β α,ℓ we have:
0 ,n) realizes the same ∆-type over A ∪ {ā γ : γ < β} in A.
[Why? As β(α
[Why? By the choice ofā
realizes the same ∆-type over A∪{ā * γ : γ < β} hence over A∪{ā γ : γ < β}.
[Why? By the choice of S 2 ].
Similarly
. .ˆā α ′′ n realizes the same ∆-type over A ∪ {ā γ : γ < β}.
4) The proofs of parts (2), (3) actually give this.
1.6
Order and unstability
Claim 2.1. The order/unstability lemma: Assume that ) or J is with density µ < |J| and µ ≥ ℵ ℓ( * ) .
Then (A, ∆) is ℵ 0 -unstable; even more specifically the demand in Definition 1.3(3) holds with ϕ ν,0 = ϕ 0 , ϕ ν,1 = ϕ 1 . Question 2.2. What can {λ : A has a (∆, λ)-order} be?
We first prove a claim from which we can derive the lemma.
(b)P = P α : α < ω ℓ( * ) (c) P α is a non-empty family of subsets of m A (d) if α < β < ω ℓ( * ) and B ∈ P β then for some B 0 , B 1 ∈ P α and pair (ϕ 0 (x,b), ϕ 1 (x,b)) ∈ Φ we have ℓ < 2 andā ∈ B ℓ ⇒ A |= ϕ ℓ (ā,b) (e) if B ∈ P β and α < β < ω 1 and F is a function with domain B and countable range, then there is B ′ ∈ P α such that B ′ ⊆ B and F ↾ B ′ is constant (f ) if ℓ( * ) = 2 we then in clause (e), on Rang(F ) we may demand just |Rang(F )| ≤ ℵ 1 .
Proof. Proof of 2.1 from 2.3 Let Φ = {(ϕ 0 (x,ȳ), ϕ 1 (x,ȳ)} and for α < ω 1+ℓ( * ) let Case 1: λ ≥ ℵ ω 1+ℓ( * ) we let P α = {I : I ⊆ m A is linearly ordered byφ and has cardinality ≥ ℵ α }.
Case 2: λ < ℵ ω ℓ( * ) . We fix µ as in ⊠ 2 of 2.1 so µ ≥ ℵ ℓ( * )−1 and let P α = {I : I ⊆ m A is linearly ordered byφ getting an order of cardinality > µ and density ≤ µ}.
This should be clear.
2.1
Proof. Proof of 2.3 For each ϕ(x) ∈ ∆ as {ā ∈ ℓg(x) A : A |= ϕ[ā]} is a Σ 1 ℓ( * ) -set and ( * ) we can find C ϕ,α : ϕ ∈ ∆ and α < ω ℓ( * )−1 such that (a) {ā ∈ ℓg(x) A : A |= ϕ[ā]} = {ā: for some α < ω ℓ( * )−1 and ν ∈ ω ω we have (ā, ν) ∈ C ϕ,α } (b) if α < ω ℓ( * )−1 then C ϕ,α is closed subset of (ℓg(x)+1) ( ω ω).
We can find functions
ω ω witnessing this and codeā continuously. For notational simplicity and without loss of generality m = 1. Let W = {w : w ⊆ ω> 2 is a front 1 hence finite}. For w ∈ W and n < ω let Q n,w be the family of objects x = (n,ū,ν,γ,φ) = (n x , . . .) such that:
( * ) n,w,x for unboundedly many α < ω ℓ( * )−1 we can find a witness (or an α-witness) y = ( ā ℓ : ℓ < n , B ρ : ρ ∈ w ) which means:
[Why? Let x = (0, <>, (∅, ∅ , <>, <>, (∃x)(x = x)) and if α < ω ℓ( * ) choose I ∈ P α we let B <> = I.] ( * ) if x ∈ Q n,w and for ρ ∈ w then there is y such that:
• y ∈ Q n,ω
[Why? As x ∈ Q n,ω we know that for some unbounded Y ⊆ ω ℓ( * )−1 for each α ∈ Y there is an α-witness ā α ℓ : ℓ < n ˆ B α ρ : ρ ∈ w as required in ( * ) n,w . Let α < ω 1 and β(α) = Min(Y \(α + 1)). Now for each ρ ∈ w, B β(α) ρ ∈ P β(α) .] ( * ) if x ∈ Q n,w and ρ ∈ w and u = (w\{ρ}) ∪ {ρˆ< 0 >, ρˆ< 1 >} so u ∈ W , then there is y ∈ Q n+1,u such that:
Let k > sup{ℓg(ν i x,ρ,ℓ : ℓ < 2, ρ ∈ w and ℓ < n} + 1 and, of course, the set {F
} is finite for each i < 2, ℓ < n, ρ ∈ w. Hence we can find a subset B α( * ) ρ of B β(α) ρ from P α and ν
Similarly for some ν * ,i ρ,ℓ : ℓ < 2, ρ ∈ w, ℓ < n such that
Now it is easy to choose y.
[Why? Similar to the proof of ( * ) 2 using clause (e) of the assumption this time.] Together it is not hard to prove the non ℵ 0 -unstability (as in [Sh:522] ).
2.3
Remark 2.4. 1) This claim can be generalized replacing ℵ 0 by µ, strong limit singular of cofinality ℵ 0 . * * * Definition 2.5.
A and x = x ℓ : ℓ < m and A |= ¬(∃x)[ϕ 0 (x,b) ∧ ϕ 1 (x,b)]} where A ⊆ A, ∆ a set of Aformulas, and 2 so Φ pr,m
2 note that this is closed to 1.3(2)(*) but the "contradictory" is interpreted differently; but eventually not serious Definition 2.6. 1) We say (A, ∆) is (µ, ∆, λ)-unstable iff there are M ⊆ A, m < ω and ā α : α < λ such that:
1A) Let A be (ℵ 0 , ∆, per)-unstable mean that (A, ∆) is ℵ 0 -unstable; here per stands for perfect. 2) We add "weakly" if we weaken clause (b) to
(so if ∆ is closed under negation there is no difference); in part (1), X = λ and in part (1A), X = ω 2.
3) We use (µ 0 , ∆, x, Q) where Q is a forcing notion iff the example is found in V Q such that usually M is in V and we add an additional possibility if x = per V then M ∈ V and X = ( ω 2) V (here per stands for perfect). 4) We may replace "a forcing notion Q" by a family K of forcing notions (e.g. the family of c.c.c. ones) meaning: for at least one of them. 5) We replace unstable by stable for the negation.
Rank and Indiscernibility
Definition 3.1. Let (A, ∆) be a Σ 1 ℓ( * ) -candidate where ℓ( * ) ∈ {1, 2}. For m < ω and B ⊆ m A we define rk ℓ( * ) (B) = rk ℓ( * ) (B, ∆, A), an ordinal or infinity or −1 by defining for any ordinal α when rk ℓ( * ) (B) ≥ α by induction on α.
Case 2: α limit. rk ℓ( * ) (B) ≥ α iff rk ℓ( * ) (B) ≥ β for every β < α.
Proof. Trivial. 
Let P α = {B ⊆ m A : rk ℓ( * ) (B) ≥ α} and apply 2.3.
Without loss of generality ( * ) ifb ⊆ A, ϕ(x,ȳ) ∈ ∆ and {α < ℵ ℓ( * ) : A |= ϕ(ā α ,b)} is bounded then it is empty. Now let P = {{ā α : α ∈ S} : S ⊆ ℵ ℓ( * ) is unbounded. Now we can prove by induction on α that B ∈ P ⇒ rk ℓ( * ) (B) ≥ α.
Claim 3.6. 1) In 3.3 we can add
Proof. ¬(e) ⇒ ¬(c).
Let M ≺ (H (χ), ∈, < * χ ) be countable such that x ∈ M for suitable x and m < ω. For everyā ∈ m A there is a function cā ∈ M from Φ m (A,∆) to {0, 1} as in Definition 1.3. So ifā i ∈ m A for i < ω ℓ( * ) then for some i < j < ω ℓ( * ) we have cā i = cā j because M is countable. So clearly (c) failsφ.
(e) ⇒ (c).
Fix (H (χ 0 ), ∈, < * χ ) and let S 0 = {M ≺ (H (χ 0 ), ∈, < * χ ) : A ∈ M and M = ℵ ℓ( * )−1 and ω ℓ( * )−1 + 1 ⊆ M }.
For m < ω and I ⊆ m A let J I = J [I] be the family of S ⊆ S 0 such that: we can find F x , c x : x ∈ H (χ) (a witness) such that:
ω> (H (χ)) → H (χ) (γ) if M ∈ S 0 is closed under F x for x ∈ M then for everyā ∈ I for some y ∈ M, c y is a witness for tp(ā M , M ∩ A, A), see Definition 1.3(2).
Clearly J I is a normal ideal on S 0 . Also if "m < ω ⇒ S 0 ∈ J [ m A]" then increasing χ we get the desired result. Toward contradiction assume that m < ω and S 0 / ∈ J [ m A] and let P (i.e. P α = P for α < ω ℓ( * ) ) be the family of I ⊆ m A such that S 0 / ∈ J I . We now finish by 2.3 once we prove ⊛ if I ∈ P then for someφ(x,b) ∈ Φ m A,∆ for each ℓ < 2 the set I ℓφ (x,b) is {ā ∈ I : A |= ϕ ℓ (ā,b)} belong to P.
(iii) if n < ω and γ 1 = γ 2 are in Rang(f n+1 ) but f n+1 (α 1 ) = γ 1 ∧ f n+1 (α 2 ) = γ 2 ⇒ f n (γ 1 ) = f n (γ 2 ) letting S = {α : f n (α) = f n (γ 1 ) = f n (γ 2 )} and β = Min(S ∩ E\(γ 1 + 1)\(γ 2 + 1), then for some formula ϕ(x 0 , . . . ,x n ) with parameters from A ∪ {a γ : γ < β} such that:
( * ) if i < 2, α ′ 0 < . . . < α ′ n+1 are from S ∩ E(ℓ ≤ n)(∃α)(f n (α) = f n (α ′ ℓ ) ∧ f n+1 (α) = γ i ) and f (α Proof. Letx =x m ,φ ν = (ϕ ν,0 (x, y ν ), ϕ ν,1 (x,ȳ)) ∈ Φ m (A,∆) for ν ∈ ω> 2 and b ν : ν ∈ ω> 2 , ā η : η ∈ ω 2 be as in Definition 1.3(3). rm Without loss of generality this is absolutely, i.e. if P is a forcing extension, and η ∈ ( ω 2) V[P] then we can chooseā η . Let Q be the forcing of adding ℵ 2 Cohens,η = η α : α < ℵ 1 , so P is trivial and easily A = A V , A V [Q] are not isomorphic: if F is such that G ⊆ Q be generic over V, η α = η α [G α ] and toward contradiction p "F is an isomorphism from A
V[Q]
onto A V where p ∈ G. So for some α( * ) < ℵ 1 , F ↾(b ν ) : ν ∈ ω> 2 depend just on η α : α < α( * ) so in V[η↾α( * )] we can compute it, so F (η α( * ) ) can have no possible value contradiction.
3.9
